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Learning the Right Lesson from 
Watergate: The Special Prosecutor and the 
Independent Counsel 
Jonathan L. Entin* 
The Saturday Night Massacre, in which Watergate Special Prosecutor 
Archibald Cox was dismissed on orders of President Richard Nixon, 
provided the impetus for the creation of the independent counsel as part of 
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.1  The gravity of the situation was 
reflected in the resignations on principle of Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, both of 
whom refused direct orders to fire Special Prosecutor Cox.2  Supporters of 
the independent counsel law contended that we needed to avoid another 
opportunity for the executive branch to squelch sensitive criminal 
investigations.3 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the independent 
counsel provisions in Morrison v. Olson,4 but the law had a meandering 
life.  Congress periodically amended and renewed the measure until 1992, 
when Republican opposition to various investigations of GOP officials led 
to its expiration.5  The independent counsel law was renewed in 1994 as a 
response to the Whitewater investigation.6  This in turn led to the 
appointment of Kenneth Starr, but the controversy over Starr’s 
investigation of President Clinton led to the expiration of the law in 1999.7  
 
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs (School of Law), David L. Brennan Professor of Law, 
and Professor of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.  E-mail: jle@case.edu.  Thanks to 
the editors of the Chapman Law Review for sponsoring this symposium and for their patience and 
support of my participation.  Thanks also to Emily Grannis for outstanding research assistance. 
 1 Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–75 (1978) (amended 1983, 1987, and 1994; 
expired 1999). 
 2 STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON 407 
(1990); see also ELIZABETH DREW, WASHINGTON JOURNAL: THE EVENTS OF 1973–1974, at 52, 54 
(1975) (noting initial uncertainty over whether Ruckelshaus had resigned or been fired). 
 3 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-273, at 2–3 (1977) (summarizing congressional proposals responding 
to the dismissal of Archibald Cox as Watergate Special Prosecutor); S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 2–7 (1977) 
(summarizing immediate and subsequent congressional responses to the Saturday Night Massacre). 
 4 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 5 KEN GORMLEY, THE DEATH OF AMERICAN VIRTUE: CLINTON VS. STARR 95–96 (2010); KATY 
J. HARRIGER, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 7 (2d ed. 2000). 
 6 See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732. 
 7 GORMLEY, supra note 5, at 655–56. 
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Many of Starr’s critics thought that his efforts vindicated Justice Scalia’s 
denunciation of the independent counsel law in his Morrison dissent.8 
This paper will examine the debate over the independent counsel law 
in light of its origins in the Watergate scandal.  It will suggest that both 
sides of the independent counsel debate have missed important points.  
Proponents of the independent counsel overlooked the real lesson of the 
Saturday Night Massacre because they focused on what happened to Cox 
rather than on what happened to Nixon. 
Critics, on the other hand, have conflated arguments about the 
constitutionality of the statute with concerns about its wisdom as a matter 
of policy.  Perhaps most notably, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Morrison, 
invoked the political process that led to the appointment of the Watergate 
special prosecutor as more acceptable than the statutory provisions in the 
Ethics in Government Act.9  Yet it is far from clear that the ground rules 
under which the Watergate special prosecutor operated were 
constitutionally preferable to those provided in the independent counsel 
law. 
There is a defensible, if not airtight, argument for the constitutionality 
of the independent counsel law that draws heavily on the Watergate 
experience.  But even if the arrangement is consistent with the Constitution, 
it is entirely possible to conclude that the independent counsel law was a 
well-intentioned reform that went awry.  The questions posed by the 
Watergate special prosecutor, however, underscore the inherent difficulty 
of crafting sound institutional responses to problems of high-level political 
corruption. 
I 
Let us begin with those who believe that the Saturday Night Massacre 
demonstrated the need for some sort of standing institutional mechanism to 
investigate executive wrongdoing.  Adherents to this view emphasize what 
happened to Special Prosecutor Cox.  Of course, being dismissed in such a 
public way was unfortunate for him, but this was hardly a career-ending 
event.  After all, Cox had taken a leave of absence from his faculty position 
at Harvard Law School to become special prosecutor, and he took up a 
prestigious visiting professorship at the University of Cambridge.10  After 
that he returned to Harvard as a University Professor, one of the highest 
honors available to a member of the faculty of the nation’s oldest 
university.11 
 
 8 See, e.g., David Broder, Fool’s  Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1999, at B7; Jeffrey Rosen, Steele 
Trap, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 26, 1999, at 44. 
 9 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 711. 
 10 KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 393 (1997). 
 11 Id. at 396. 
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The situation looks very different if we focus instead on what 
happened to President Nixon.  Faced with what his own aides described as 
a “firestorm” of criticism that badly undermined his credibility following 
the Saturday Night Massacre,12 the chief executive had to acquiesce in the 
appointment of Leon Jaworski as the new special prosecutor.13  Jaworski’s 
persistence led to the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Nixon,14 
which resulted in the release of the so-called “smoking gun” tape of June 
23, 1972, which in turn led to Nixon’s forced resignation.15 
II 
Congress eventually responded to the Saturday Night Massacre by 
enacting the independent counsel law.16  Its provisions required the 
Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation of information 
suggesting that high-level executive officials had violated federal criminal 
laws.17  That investigation could last no more than 90 days.18  If, at the end 
of this period, the Attorney General found no reasonable grounds to believe 
that a crime had been committed, the matter ended.19  Otherwise, the 
Attorney General was required to refer the matter to a special court that 
would appoint an independent counsel who could be removed only by the 
Attorney General and only for good cause.20 
Critics, perhaps most notably Justice Scalia dissenting in Morrison v. 
Olson, argue that the law was unconstitutional because it allowed judges, 
rather than the President, to appoint an independent counsel and not only 
barred the chief executive from removing such an official, but also limited 
the grounds on which the Attorney General could dismiss an independent 
counsel.21  Indeed, Justice Scalia lamented the demise of what he called 
“our former constitutional system”22 in attacking the ruling upholding the 
independent counsel law, and specifically invoked the Watergate special 
prosecutor to illustrate what he viewed as an acceptable political response 
to allegations of executive wrongdoing.23  A closer look at the institutional 
 
 12 DREW, supra note 2, at 66; KUTLER, supra note 2, at 411. 
 13 DREW, supra note 2, at 91; KUTLER, supra note 2, at 426. 
 14 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 15 See generally DREW, supra note 2, at 332–413; KUTLER, supra note 2, at 513–50. 
 16 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867–75 
(amended 1983, 1987, and 1994; expired 1999). Because the statute has expired, the following 
summary of the independent counsel law is taken from Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660–64 
(1988).  The various versions of the independent counsel law differed in certain particulars, but not in 
any way that detracts from the summary provided in text. 
 17 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988). 
 18 Id. at 660–61. 
 19 Id. at 661. 
 20 Id. at 661–63. The requirement of a referral to the special court applied both when the Attorney 
General concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had been committed and 
when the Attorney General could not determine whether such grounds existed. Id. at 661 n.4. 
 21 Id. at 705–09 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 22 Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 23 Id. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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arrangements relating to the second Watergate special prosecutor, Leon 
Jaworski, suggests that Justice Scalia’s invocation of those arrangements as 
preferable to those in the independent counsel law might have been 
misguided. 
Both the Watergate special prosecutor and the independent counsel 
were effectively insulated from the day-to-day supervision of the Attorney 
General.  That was, of course, the point of both arrangements.  Let us 
consider the provisions for removing these officials.  As noted above, an 
independent counsel could be removed only by the Attorney General—not 
by the President—and only for cause.  The Watergate special prosecutor, 
on the other hand, could be removed by the President—but only for 
“extraordinary improprieties” and, even then, only after the chief executive 
had “first consult[ed] the Majority and the Minority Leaders and Chairmen 
and ranking Minority Members of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate 
and House of Representatives and ascertain[ed] that their consensus [was] 
in accord with [the President’s] proposed action.”24  The Supreme Court 
quoted this regulation in a footnote in the Watergate tapes case but attached 
no substantive significance to the removal mechanism.25  Perhaps this 
provision was overlooked because President Nixon’s lawyers did not attack 
the requirement of congressional approval of the removal of the special 
prosecutor.  Whatever the explanation, this arrangement raised significant 
separation of powers concerns under the law as it existed in 1974 and as it 
exists today. 
The 1926 decision in Myers v. United States26 remains the leading 
case on the removal power.  In Myers, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Taft, ruled unconstitutional a statute that required the Senate 
to give its consent to the removal of a local postmaster before the 
expiration of the postmaster’s four-year term of office.27  Although 
subsequent cases have addressed different aspects of the removal power 
and suggest that Congress may limit the grounds for removal of certain 
officers,28 the Supreme Court has made clear that the legislative branch 
may not reserve for itself any formal role in the actual process of removing 
federal officials beyond the constitutionally authorized impeachment 
mechanism.29 
It is not as though Nixon’s lawyers ignored Myers.  Their brief on the 
merits invoked that precedent as exemplifying the centrality of separation 
 
 24 Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 28 C.F.R. § 0.38 app. (1974). 
 25 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 n.8 (1974). 
 26 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 27 Id. at 107, 176. 
 28 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (dual 
for-cause limitation on removal of interior officers); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) 
(implied for-cause  requirement  for  removing  members  of   the  War  Claims  Commission);;  Humphrey’s  
Ex’r  v.  United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (for-cause requirement for removing members of the Federal 
Trade Commission). 
 29 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–27 (1986); Myers, 272 U.S. at 172–73. 
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of powers and supporting the notion that the President is immune from 
compulsory process.30  The brief went on to mention, almost in passing, 
that “the specific holding of the Myers case was narrowed to some extent” 
in a subsequent case, although “that narrowing was on a point that does 
not bear on the present issue.”31 
From a contemporary perspective, this seems like a legal gaffe.  After 
all, Myers held that requiring Senate consent for the removal of a 
postmaster unconstitutionally impinged on presidential power.32  The 
subsequent case to which Nixon’s brief referred, Humphrey’s Executor v. 
United States,33 upheld a statutory provision requiring that the President 
have cause to remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission.34  But 
the regulation requiring the President to consult with and obtain consensus 
approval from the leadership of both houses of Congress before 
discharging the Watergate special prosecutor goes well beyond the cause 
requirement upheld in Humphrey’s Executor, and that arrangement might 
pose even greater constitutional problems than the postmaster provision 
that Myers rejected.  In Myers the full Senate had to act, whereas the 
Watergate regulation empowered a handful of influential senators and 
representatives to prevent the President from discharging the special 
prosecutor.35 
Before dismissing Nixon’s failure to invoke Myers as a basis for 
challenging the removal restrictions in the special prosecutor regulation, we 
should put matters into historical and intellectual context.  Although Myers 
suggests that the President has unfettered power to remove all appointed 
officials who exercise any part of the executive power, the notion that the 
removal power provides the basis for an expansive theory of the unitary 
executive is a more recent phenomenon.36  Whatever this might suggest 
about the actual importance of the removal power, at the least it implies 
that President Nixon and his lawyers did not believe that attacking the 
requirement of congressional consent to the dismissal of the Watergate 
special prosecutor was a promising line of argument.37 
 
 30 Brief for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States at 
73, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Nos. 73-1766, 73-1834). 
 31 Id. at 74 (citing Humphrey’s  Ex’r, 295 U.S. 602) (emphasis added). 
 32 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176. 
 33 295 U.S. 602 (1925). 
 34 Id. at 620, 632. 
 35 Compare Myers, 272 U.S. at 107, with Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 28 
C.F.R. § 0.38 app. (1974). 
 36 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723–27 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The  President’s  Power   to  Execute   the  Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 
(1994). 
 37 Even if the Supreme Court invalidated this aspect of the regulation, it is not at all clear that the 
Court  would   have   ruled   in  Nixon’s   favor.    Perhaps the Court would have excised the objectionable 
portion of the removal section of the regulation on the theory that this provision was severable and left 
the remaining aspects of the regulation intact. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161–62 (2010) (severing the objectionable dual-cause provision and allowing the 
agency to exercise its statutory functions). Whether and to what extent the severability doctrine might 
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Regardless of the explanation for ignoring the removal procedures 
applicable to the Watergate special prosecutor, the larger point remains 
valid.  Under contemporary doctrine, as well as the precedents in place 
during the Watergate litigation, the constitutional propriety of the removal 
provisions was questionable at best.  For this reason, it is not clear that the 
arrangements relating to the Watergate special prosecutor were in fact less 
problematic than the independent counsel law that has come under such 
harsh constitutional criticism. 
Justice Scalia attacked the independent counsel law starting from first 
principles: the Constitution divides and separates federal power such that 
any incursion on presidential authority was presumptively impermissible.38  
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Morrison v. Olson never 
really joined issue with Justice Scalia, but there is another first principle 
under which the independent counsel law might have been supported: the 
checks and balances view that the executive branch could not be trusted to 
investigate itself and therefore a carefully structured institutional 
mechanism such as the independent counsel might serve important 
constitutional values.39 
From a checks and balances perspective, the independent counsel law 
gave the executive branch complete control over the initiation of 
proceedings involving covered officials, who were either high-level 
executive officers or close political allies of the President.40  Moreover, the 
major features of the statute kept the appointment and removal of an 
independent counsel out of congressional hands.41  If the Attorney General 
concluded, after a preliminary investigation, that there were no reasonable 
grounds to believe that a targeted person had committed a federal crime, 
the matter was closed and that decision was not subject to judicial review.42  
If the Attorney General could not close the matter at that point (either 
because there were reasonable grounds to believe that a federal crime had 
occurred or because it was not clear whether such grounds existed), the 
matter went to a special court that was authorized to appoint an 
independent counsel.43  The independent counsel took on all of the 
investigative and prosecutorial authority of the Attorney General, who 
 
apply to regulations of the sort at issue in United States v. Nixon as opposed to statutory provisions is 
beyond the scope of this essay.  For criticism of the severability doctrine, see generally Tom Campbell, 
Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495 (2011). 
 38 Morrison,  487  U.S.  at  699  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting)  (“Frequently  an  issue  of  this  sort  will  come  
before  the  Court  clad,  so  to  speak,  in  sheep’s  clothing: the potential of the asserted principle to effect 
important change in the equilibrium of power is not immediately evident . . . .  But this wolf comes as a 
wolf.”). 
 39 This was the approach taken by the dissenting opinion in the lower court in Morrison. See In re 
Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), rev’d  sub  nom. Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 40  See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–61. 
 41  See id. at 660–64. 
 42  Id. at 660–61. 
 43 Id. 
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could remove the counsel only for cause.44  In other words, an executive 
official determined whether an independent counsel would be appointed 
and whether an independent counsel could be removed.  The cause 
requirement, of course, limited executive power, but the limitation was for 
the purpose of checking abuses of executive discretion in situations where 
the executive branch has a conflict of interest and therefore might need to 
face some kind of institutional check.  Indeed, the Solicitor General in 
Myers conceded that Congress might permissibly require cause for removal 
of executive officials.45 
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of this argument is characterizing 
the independent counsel as an inferior officer, as the Morrison Court did,46 
in light of more recent rulings suggesting that inferior officers must report 
to a superior official.47  Nevertheless, those decisions do not purport to 
undermine the continuing vitality of Morrison. 
Justice Scalia added one more structural objection to the independent 
counsel law: the measure was unfair to the object of the investigation 
because the independent counsel has a single target and operates free from 
many of the practical and political constraints that limit the ability of 
ordinary prosecutors to rein in their efforts.48  Whatever the validity of 
these concerns, Justice Scalia did not explain how the arrangements under 
which the Watergate special prosecutor operated alleviated them.  To be 
sure, the regulations under which both Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski 
functioned gave them “the greatest degree of independence that is 
consistent with the Attorney General’s statutory accountability for all 
matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice,”49 
whereas an independent counsel had “full power and independent authority 
to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the 
Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or 
employee of the Department of Justice.”50  At least in theory, then, the 
special prosecutor was more accountable to the Attorney General than an 
independent counsel. 
Nevertheless, the response to the Saturday Night Massacre suggests 
that the distinction was more apparent than real.  The special prosecutor, 
like an independent counsel, focused on a limited number of targets in 
 
 44 Id. at 662–63. 
 45 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 90, 96 (1926) (oral argument for the United States); 
Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative 
Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 744–45 (1987). 
 46 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671. 
 47 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010); 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1997). 
 48 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 49 Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed Reg. 14688, 14688 (June 4, 1973) 
(Cox); Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 30738, 30739 (Nov. 7, 1973) 
(Jaworski). 
 50 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 662. 
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connection with a defined series of events.  The special prosecutor, like an 
independent counsel, had no need to consider how much priority to attach 
to a particular investigation relative to other criminal matters or how 
aggressively to pursue one or a few potential targets compared with others 
in unrelated matters because the special prosecutor, like an independent 
counsel, had no other unrelated targets or matters to address.  These 
similarities have less to do with the mechanisms by which the Watergate 
special prosecutor and the independent counsels were appointed and 
removed than they do with the peculiar characteristics of sensitive 
investigations of high-level executive officials.  In this sense, the problem 
is more institutional than constitutional.  We should not pretend otherwise. 
III 
The Saturday Night Massacre led to the enactment of the independent 
counsel law.  Although that measure seemed like a necessary prophylactic 
measure, today there seems to be bipartisan consensus that the independent 
counsel law did not work out very well.  But whatever its defects, the 
disillusionment that many people of diverse political outlooks share does 
not make the law unconstitutional.  We should not conflate wisdom with 
constitutionality.  Just because some arrangement turns out to be of dubious 
wisdom does not make it unconstitutional.51 
The Watergate special prosecutor was a political response to a 
political crisis.52  President Nixon was forced to accept the appointment of 
Archibald Cox as the first special prosecutor and, when he concluded that 
Cox had to go, had to acquiesce in the appointment of Leon Jaworski.  The 
largely unnoticed but constitutionally dubious requirement that the 
congressional leadership in both houses approve of any dismissal of 
Jaworski reflected the widespread dismay over Cox’s sacking.53  Because 
President Nixon had lost the confidence of important segments of the 
polity, the addition of the congressional leadership seemed to be a 
necessary element for allowing the investigation to proceed. 
The independent counsel law sought to avoid the necessity for 
improvisation that characterized the Watergate situation.  It did so by 
establishing a limited number of high-level executive officials and close 
 
 51 See Jonathan L. Entin, Congress, the President, and the Separation of Powers: Rethinking the 
Value of Litigation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 56 (1991). 
 52 So was the appointment of special prosecutors to investigate the Teapot Dome scandal. See S.J. 
Res. 54, ch. 16, 68th Cong., 43 Stat. 5 (1924); see generally BURT NOGGLE, TEAPOT DOME: OIL AND 
POLITICS IN THE 1920’s   91–115 (1962). Justice Scalia also cited this example approvingly in his 
Morrison dissent. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Unlike either the Watergate special 
prosecutor or the independent counsel, the President appointed the Teapot Dome prosecutors with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. S.J. Res. 54, 43 Stat. at 6; NOGGLE, supra, at 114–15. 
 53 The  regulation  that  initially  created  Cox’s  position  as  special  prosecutor  provided that he could 
be  removed  only  “for  extraordinary  improprieties  on  his  part.”  Office  of  Watergate Special Prosecution 
Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 14688, 14688 (June 4, 1973). A  court  later  determined  that  Cox’s  dismissal  violated  
this regulation. See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1973). 
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political advisors to the President whose suspected involvement in serious 
federal crimes might create too many conflicts of interest for the normal 
investigative procedures of the Department of Justice to engender public 
confidence.  As a result, partisans on both sides of the political aisle and 
many other Americans concluded that the independent counsel law did 
more harm than good.  It seems highly unlikely that such a measure could 
be adopted in the foreseeable future. 
Perhaps it is difficult to reconcile some of the specific details of both 
the Watergate special prosecutor and the independent counsel with both a 
strictly formal reading of the Constitution and some ideal political theory.  
Institutional design is a formidable challenge even when political comity is 
in greater supply than it has seemed to be in recent times.  Beyond that, 
however, the difficulties inherent in both the Watergate special prosecutor 
arrangements and the independent counsel law suggest that reliance on 
purely legal responses to problems that are fundamentally political 
inevitably will lead to frustration.54 
 
 54 See HARRIGER, supra note 5, at 215–32. 
